Computational theory of the self (computational Dennett)
Explanation
The computational theory of the self associated with Daniel Dennett (1942-2024), one of the most influential philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century and the early twenty-first (Tufts University), was developed in works such as Consciousness Explained (1991) and Freedom Evolves (2003), as well as in numerous articles. Dennett proposed a radical functionalist-computational view of the self and consciousness combining philosophy of mind, cognitive science, AI and evolutionary theory.
For Dennett, the self is not a substantial entity in the brain (there is no central homunculus, no Cartesian Theatre where consciousness occurs, in his famous critique of the Cartesian Theater). The self is a narrative centre of gravity: a useful abstraction for organising and explaining the behaviours of a complex organism. Just as the centre of gravity of a physical object is a mathematical point (not a real part of the object), the self is a theoretical construction that allows prediction and explanation of human behaviour patterns.
His model of consciousness is the Multiple Drafts Model: instead of a single linear flow of consciousness, there are multiple parallel processes producing drafts (tentative interpretations, perceptions, thoughts, memories) that compete, are edited, are combined. What we call consciousness is a relatively late and retrospective effect of this multi-threaded process: there is dominance of some drafts, which become embodied in verbal reports and memory. There is no moment at which something becomes conscious.
Dennett develops this view applying three levels of analysis (the intentional stance of attributing beliefs and desires to systems, the physical description of mechanisms, and descriptions of functional design), and with tools of memetic evolution (developed with Richard Dawkins): our minds are products of both biological and cultural evolutionary selection. The human self is the product of millennia of biological evolution (capable brains) and cultural evolution (languages, narratives, social practices).
This perspective has been influential but also controversial. Critics such as John Searle, Chalmers, Ned Block argue that Dennett explains consciousness by eliminating consciousness: if consciousness is just these functional processes, then it is being deflated or eliminated rather than genuinely explained. The hard problem of why there is subjective experience at all is left unaddressed (Dennett holds that the hard problem is a pseudo-problem).
For the theory of consciousness in the context of AI, Dennett's view is relatively permissive: if the self is a functional abstraction of complex computational processes, and consciousness is an emergent effect of parallel processing with certain functional properties, then there is no principled reason why sufficiently sophisticated AI systems could not have selves and consciousness in the same sense humans have them. Dennett in his last years took a somewhat cautious position regarding AI but his general theoretical framework is compatible with genuine artificial consciousness. As a bold and provocative synthesis of philosophy, cognitive science and AI, Dennett's work remains a central reference, subject to debate but impossible to ignore in any serious discussion about the nature of the conscious self in the computational era.
Strengths
- Rigorous deflation of the substantial self.
- Compatibility with distributed neuroscience.
- Constructive programme for AI with recursive self-model.
- Continuity with Hofstadter, Gödel and reflexive logic.
- Persistent influence on computational philosophy of mind.
Main critiques
- Elimination of the substantial self philosophically controversial.
- Formalisation of the 'strange loop' still incomplete.
- Does not demonstrate that the loop is sufficient for qualia.
- Few specific testable empirical predictions.