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Consciousness as interface (Hoffman)

Donald Hoffman
Era21st century · 2019
RegionNorth America · United States
DisciplineCognitive sciences

Explanation

Donald Hoffman (b. 1955), professor of cognitive sciences at the University of California Irvine, has elaborated over the last fifteen years a radical proposal about consciousness and reality that has generated great debate: the Interface Theory of Perception and, more broadly, his conscious realism. His main works are Visual Intelligence (1998), The Case Against Reality (2019) and numerous articles in academic journals.

Hoffman starts from results in evolutionary game theory: using simulations, he showed that organisms whose perceptions are veridical (faithfully representing the underlying reality) tend to go extinct, surpassed by organisms with fitness-tuned perceptions, which represent only the information relevant to survival, filtered and even systematically distorted. Evolution does not select for truth, but for utility. Our perceptions are therefore a useful interface, not a faithful reflection of reality.

Hoffman's analogy is the desktop of a computer: the file icons (blue sheets, yellow folders) are useful for interacting with the computer, but bear no resemblance to what the files really are (patterns of voltages in memory, binary code). A user who thought files literally were little blue squares would be gravely confused. Analogously, our perceptions of the world (solid objects in space-time, with colours, shapes, etc.) are useful icons for interaction, but do not resemble the underlying reality.

What is that underlying reality? Here Hoffman becomes radically non-physicalist. He proposes that fundamental reality is constituted by interacting conscious agents. The mathematical theory of conscious agents (Hoffman and colleagues, especially Chetan Prakash) formalises a network of agents that exchange experiences. Physical space-time emerges as the structure of this more fundamental dynamics. Hoffman connects this with recent findings in theoretical physics suggesting that space-time may not be fundamental.

Hoffman dialogues with physics (on the end of space-time as fundamental, Arkani-Hamed and colleagues), with philosophy (idealism, panpsychism, contemplative traditions), with experimental psychophysics (his own studies on perception). His position is controversial: scientifically bold, philosophically heterodox, but rigorously argued in peer-reviewed publications. His TED talks have had millions of views.

For the theory of consciousness, Hoffman's proposal inverts the traditional consciousness-world relation: it is not that consciousness emerges from the physical world, but that the physical world (space-time included) is the interface of an underlying reality constituted by interacting consciousness. This has affinities with idealism, with panpsychism, with traditions such as Yogacara Buddhist Consciousness-Only, with certain recent physical results. Critics object that the theory speculates too much, that the mathematics may not correspond to reality, that the ontological status of the conscious agents is underdetermined. But as a bold proposal that combines rigorous cognitive science, philosophy of mind and theoretical physics into a coherent vision alternative to standard physicalism, Hoffman's work is one of the most stimulating in the contemporary panorama.

Strengths

  • Rigorous mathematical formulation (FBT theorems).
  • Integrates evolution, perception and metaphysics.
  • Original monist ontological proposal.
  • Cultural impact (TED Talks, dissemination).

Main critiques

  • The leap from the evolutionary result to metaphysical conclusions is contested.
  • Empirical verification of CAT is very limited.
  • Metaphysical speculation that exceeds the evidence.

Connections with other theories