Self-representationalism
Explanation
Uriah Kriegel and other philosophers have developed an alternative to HOT: self-representationalism. According to this proposal, a mental state is conscious when it represents itself intrinsically, not by having a separate state to represent it. Consciousness would be a reflexive property inherent to certain mental states, not an external relation to other states.
The motivation comes from problems with HOT. If consciousness requires a separate state representing the first one, what happens when that separate state is misaligned with the first state, or when the first state exists without representation? HOT generates uncomfortable counter-examples. Self-representationalism avoids them by positing that the conscious state includes its own self-representation as a constitutive part of itself.
The proposal has ancient philosophical roots. Brentano, in the nineteenth century, had held that all conscious mental states are conscious of themselves in addition to being conscious of their primary object. When I see an apple, I not only see the apple, but implicitly note that I see. This intrinsic awareness does not require a second state: it is a property of the first.
Kriegel formalises the proposal in contemporary terms, combining phenomenology (Husserl, Brentano) with analytic philosophy (functionalism, representationalism). He distinguishes between focal awareness (centred on the object: I see the apple) and peripheral awareness (the awareness of seeing, which accompanies it), and argues that the second is constitutive of the first.
An advantage of the proposal is that it avoids the potential infinite regress of HOT: no higher levels of representation are needed because each conscious state already contains its self-awareness. Moreover, it fits well with certain phenomenological intuitions: experience is never purely transitive towards an object; there is always a flavour of myself experiencing this.
Self-representationalism is less popular than HOT or first-order approaches, but has gained defenders at the intersection of analytic philosophy and phenomenology. It remains alive as an alternative in the complex landscape of philosophical theories of consciousness, and is part of the effort to articulate a precise notion of self-awareness that is theoretically and empirically tractable.
Strengths
- Captures the self-reference inherent in conscious experience.
- Avoids the regress of HOT.
- Dialogue with the phenomenological tradition (Brentano).
- Articulated analytically with precision.
Main critiques
- The concept of 'intrinsic self-representation' is opaque.
- Does not explain qualia.
- Difficult empirical operationalisation.
- Accused of being a beautiful idea without a mechanism.